In some policy areas such as urban planning, waste management or environmental policy widespread demands for citizen participation have been met in the last twenty years or so.
Introduction
Political participation is a key means for the inclusion of citizens in democracies. Since the mid-1960s, political sociologists observe a "participatory revolution" especially in Western liberal democracies where demands for 'more', 'better' and 'enhanced' citizen participation are frequently raised. This led to the evolution of new forms of conventional as well as unconventional political participation as well as to the extension regarding the social fields to which democratization demands are addressed (labour market, family, education system etc.). In policy areas such as urban planning, waste management or environmental policy claims for citizen participation have been met in the last twenty years or so. It is today anything but unusual to involve local citizens in one way or another in planning processes that affect the local community.
The normative core of the participatory claim is the "government of the people" ideal.
According to its advocates, more citizen participation is often equated with more democracy. This equation is widely theorised in participatory democratic theories; it is, however, problematic. There can be no doubt that citizen participation is essential for a vivid democracy; no democratic theory can do without citizen involvement -yet, they differ enormously as who exactly by which instruments, to what extent and for what functions this should be realised. Also, many forms of participation (i.e. pressure group politics) do not follow the democratic method in the sense of majority rule. Political theorists, therefore, distinguish between participation and democracy; the forms and functions of participation required for democratic rule are contested (Kohout 2002, 37ff.) .
The field of science and technology policy is particularly interesting for studying citizens' participation. Nevertheless, political science has so far widely neglected this policy field and, with some exception, left it to science and technology studies (STS). One of the reasons for this is that political science seems to share the common positivist belief that this policy field should be left to scientific experts (especially with a background in the natural sciences and in engineering) due to the strong link to scientific and technological knowledge; thus, the democratic method cannot be applied to science and technology (S&T) policy (Gottweis 2002 ). Yet, the factual dimension (Sachdimension) is only one aspect in S&T policy; the social dimension (Sachdimension) is becoming increasingly important. Historically, S&T was, in fact, among the first policy fields where claims for citizen participation were raised when the equation of scientific and technological progress with social progress started to crumble in the 1960s (Nelkin 1984) . Since the 1990s we can observe a lively conceptual debate on citizen involvement in the field of technology assessment (TA) and, moreover, a changing political practice. Today, many organisations are active in developing participatory methods of TA -even parliamentary TA organizations (Joss 2000) . Notwithstanding, participatory TA is neither empirically well established nor is it currently the most widespread TA instrument, but the issue itself is today certainly at the very heart of TA activities and debate (Joss and Bellucci 2002) . While most participation takes place at national level, recently some first attempts for participatory TA (pTA) have been undertaken also at European level.
In addition to that, there is a lively conceptual debate on pTA among practitioners and scholars. For many years, a euphoric and highly ideological assessment of "democratic TA" (Abels and Bora 2004 ) has prevailed; recently, more pragmatic and critical voices are heard. In this paper I argue that there are important reasons to be sceptical about pTA and its performance judged against the two ascribed main functions of increasing the legitimacy and accountability of what is today called science governance. There are theoretical reasons to be sceptical given that the strong normative claims are based on a reductionism of what 'true' or the best democracy is, i.e. deliberative democracy. Furthermore, there are empirical reasons to be sceptical given that our knowledge about the functions of pTA is so far still limited. Yet, these functions cannot be separated from the forms of pTA developed in the last decade or so. My key theoretical argument is that participatory procedures do not per se improve the democratic legitimacy and accountability of policy-making in the difficult field of science and technology, but may do so only under very specific conditions that relate to the forms and functions of pTA. This argument is based on a nonnormative approach to pTA as well as on a review of the relevant literature resulting in a heuristic typology, which relates forms of pTA to possible functions.
In the following I firstly give a brief overview over the field of pTA (section 2). I continue with a theoretical discussion of the issue of legitimacy and accountability in science governance (section 3). I then present a heuristic typology derived from the literature linking forms of procedures to their function and discuss the identified seven types of pTA model in the light of theories of democracy (section 4). In section 5 I link the typology to key theoretical and also methodological issues; finally, I draw some conclusions (section 6).
The practical and conceptual development of pTA
The origins of technology assessment go back to the 1960s when awareness was raised of the negative social outcomes of scientific and technological innovations. TA is essentially an interdisciplinary endeavour to identify positive and negative impacts of technologies in order to rationalize S&T policy-making. In the 1970s and 1980s, numerous academic organizations as well as parliamentary institutions for technology assessment were founded (Vig and Paschen 2000). However, they mainly employ an expert model of TA that rests on a decision-oriented style of policy advise (Bechmann 1993; Grunwald 2002) .
1 The main focus is on the factual dimension of science and technology.
Increasingly, experts became confronted with counter-experts (expert dilemma); this competition between expertise and counter-expertise reveals that science is not an objective and value-free endeavour, but socially constructed. Science has lost its authority (Weingart 1999) . This expert dilemma and the ''politicisation of science' turned the attention to the social dimension in conflicts over science and technology. Since the 1990s, instruments and procedures for involving citizens in science governance have become popular. In this sense, participatory TA is a response to the demand for policy-making procedures that allow integrating the factual (Sachdimension) and the social (Sozialdimension) dimension of conflicts over the role of science and technology for society.
Moreover, pTA has since then been vindicated on normative, democratic grounds (see Renn et al. 1995a; Bechmann 1993; Hennen 1993; Webler et al. 2001 ).
2 Such accounts were supported by a social-constructivist turn in policy analysis that argues for public participation in policy-making and planning (Fischer and Forester 1993; Fischer 1990 ).
Proponents invoke an almost "romanticising view" regarding the social functions they ascribe to pTA. It is believed to, firstly, enhance the knowledge and values basis of policy-making; in this sense it is a form of mode 2 knowledge production and a means to democratise expertise;
secondly, to open up opportunities for conflict resolution and achieving the common good; thirdly, to increase the motivation of those involved and initiate a process of social learning; and, fourthly, to provide economic actors with a better understanding of consumer and stakeholder concern. In so doing, it is finally believed to improve the legitimacy and accountability of political decision in the field of science and technology. Yet these claims about functions require empirical verification.
What are the main issues and gaps of pTA research? From the very beginning, there has been a call for systematic evaluation of pTA (Joss 1995) ; nevertheless, there is still a lack of systematic, especially comparative, as well as theoretically informed empirical studies on pTA especially regarding its performance. Empirical research sketches out a vivid picture about the crossnational diffusion of procedures, the development of different models for pTA, as well as on practical problems of pTA. 3 There are number of highly informative and most relevant case studies.
Only recently comparative research on pTA has started, often funded by the European Commission A major field of pTA experiments and, consequently, of pTA research has been biotechnology. The main reason for this is the perception of biotechnology as a risk technology that is deeply affected, on the one hand, by contested scientific expertise and epistemological uncertainty; both pertain to specific and unspecific 'non-knowledge' (Nichtwissen) that is characteristic for risk technologies (Japp 1997 The assessment of the impact has been a key concern of pTA research; however, impact has been operationalised in very different ways -often very pragmatic and problematic since it is hardly connected to social theory (Guston 1999; Joss 1998; Mayer et al. 1995) . A conceptualisation of impact, however, requires a theoretical framework about the functioning of policy-making and what is considered 'the public' in liberal democracies; here social sciences provide a number of different models that can be employed in pTA research.
What is maybe most amazing is that although deliberation is the key procedural feature, there are hardly any empirical data on what is actually happening in the deliberative process. Case studies discuss the input in the procedure (e.g. selection criteria) and procedural issues (e.g. fairness)
as well as the outcome (i.e. impact) whereas the actual deliberation itself and its output (i.e. the citizen's report) are black-boxed! PARADYS (Bora and Hausendorf 2004) is, for example, the only research project analysing the deliberative communication itself employing linguistic concepts and methods. Moreover, while we do have criteria for assessing the quality of expert advice, there are no such criteria for assessing citizen's reports. Yet, according to Helga Nowotny (Nowotny 2005) quality control is the Achilles' heel of the Mode 2 way of knowledge production in general.
In addition, there is still a severe lack of theoretical reflection on pTA. What is needed is pTA studies that link ongoing developments to broader social and political changes and their conceptualisation in social theories. This is not to say that pTA is without any theoretical or rather conceptual foundation, yet the question is what level of theory is necessary. Many of the attempts to theorise pTA can be described as either merely normative -i.e. without any force to deliver relevant social scientific descriptions, not to speak about explanations -or as "tool box theories", which means that they consist of a syncretistic mixtures of sometimes even incompatible fragments.
In sum, until today there are severe desiderata regarding systematic empirical research as well as theorizing on pTA. The empirical reality of pTA often differs from the strong normative claims.
Overall, participatory procedures are still in an experimental stage. Empirical studies clearly illustrate that pTA is, firstly, highly context-sensitive and, secondly, most procedures are not clearly linked to the political system even though one of the major objectives is to serve as a form of bottom-up policy advice. This paper surely cannot fill, but illuminate some of the gaps and discuss direction for future systematic research. My core argument is that future research has to take the linkage between forms and functions of pTA into account.
Legitimacy and accountability of pTA
Two ascribed principal functions of pTA are legitimacy and accountability. Yet, if this is the case is first and foremost an empirical question. Such assessment has to be rooted in normative concepts; thus, it strongly depends on the underlying theoretical model of democracy. In the following, I briefly introduce these concepts (for a more extensive discussion of legitimacy see Abels and Bora 2004) .
Democratic political systems cannot survive without mechanisms securing their legitimacy.
There are two principal ways for achieving this support or legitimacy; one focuses on the input side of the policy process, one concentrates on the output side (Scharpf 1970) . Input legitimacy pertains to the social dimension insofar as it considers who has actually access to the policy process and who can influence policy-making; it is based on normative criteria such as, for example, selfdetermination (government of the people). Output legitimacy, in contrast, builds on a concept of policy-making as problem-solving in the interest of the general public. The criterion here is functional, i.e. utilitarian effectiveness, and the focus is on the factual dimension of conflicts. Input and output legitimacy are not separate, but closely interlinked, because output legitimacy builds, in fact, on some form of political inclusion and representation whereas input models argue that inclusion allows to achieve a better quality of the output such as enhanced acceptance and compliance (Wolf 2000, 164ff.) . Some models of democracy clearly focus on input legitimacy (e.g.
participatory or pluralist models) and can be labelled "process-oriented" (Schmidt 1997, 26 ) whereas "result-oriented" (e.g. elitist and expertocratic models) concentrate on the output side.
Today deliberative models are very prominent, yet more in theoretical debates over democracy than in democratic practice. Applying the distinction between input and output legitimacy, they can be located somewhere in between due to their specific assumptions about the linkage between input and output factors. 4 Yet, there is a tendency towards the input side given the strong role of procedural rules. Deliberative theories respond to the growth in complexity and knowledge involved in policy-making today. Against the background of different stages in the policy-making process, deliberative models are usually linked to the preparation of decisions (rather than to decision-making) due to the way in which they provide good reasons for decision.
Furthermore, deliberative theories today are inspired by an egalitarian vision of a 'mass' participation in public deliberation whereas deliberation in older concepts was restricted to policy elites (see Warren 2002) . Finally, we can distinguish between a weak version of deliberative democracy, which argues in favour of procedural improvement of policy-making, and a strong version, which is based on Habermas' theory of communicative interaction and the idea of an argumentative discourse free of domination and subjugation. Enhanced participation is not a means in itself (like in participatory models), but an inclusion of those affected is a means for producing better or more reasonable policies. 'Effective policies' are thus the result of argumentative reasoning. From a science governance perspective this has a bearing on the status and kind of expertise, which is 'fed into' the discourse. Participation then goes hand in hand with an inclusion of different forms of expertise way beyond mere expert knowledge; the 'democratization of expertise' calls for adopting a wider concept of policy-relevant expertise and knowledge. Different social groups can contribute different forms of expertise. In this process of discursive reasoning among social actors, individual interests (which are at the heart of liberal models) then go through a quasi "purgatory process" (Abromeit 2002, 103;  my translation), which enables that only the best arguments can prevail. In this sense, Heidrun
Abromeit speaks of an "epistemic proceduralism" (ibid., 108; my translation). Hence, the quality of results -or effectiveness -is linked to the question of input and becomes a key concern; in other words: the factual and the social dimension of policy-making are connected.
Obviously, a number of arguments have been raised against deliberative models: The key argument is that there is no such ideal discourse, because it is always affected by social factors (e.g. rhetoric skills, social authority). Standards criteria of political participation due also affect deliberative procedures. Furthermore, deliberation favours a model of communication that adapts to rational reasoning such as in scientific discourse, which, in turn, places very high demands on the participants. This communicative bias could lead to a de facto exclusion of groups of participants.
Finally, their procedural coupling with the policy process and institutional coupling with representative democracy is all but clear.
How does the accountability issue fit into this picture? Accountability is, in general, a principle that contributes to the legitimacy of a political system; it can be conceptualized in different ways. It is viewed as a rather formal ex post assessment of decisions or actions of political institutions along the criteria of openness and scrutiny; for example, it was historically linked to bureaucratic models and perceive in an upward way (i.e. bureaucrats are superior to their superiors). Yet, over time a notion of downward accountability become dominant according to which bureaucrats have to be accountable to the customers of public services (Peters and Wright 1998, 634f.) . Parliamentary accountability is another rather 'old' form of accountability, which is strongly related to the input dimension of legitimacy. Today accountability is perceived as essential for good governance based on a wider conceptualisation. According to the PubAcc project "public accountability (relates) to policy-and decision-making processes, the dynamics of social mobilisation, and wider public sphere discourse" (Joss and Mohr 2004) . In this sense, claims for enhanced citizen participation are a "response to the perceived dysfunction of formal public accountability provisions"; different forms of public involvement are then considered a new form of public accountability (ibid.). At the same time, "(t)he new mechanisms of public accountability, however, do not fully manage to provide viable alternatives to traditional accountability mechanisms to date" (ibid.).
Proposal for a pTA typology: linking forms to functions
Until today a variety of techniques or procedures for involving citizens in science governance have been developed. However, the sheer variety of techniques and their sometimes flamboyant names can be condensed to a good handful of distinct types or models (Abels and Bora 2004) . 5 The following heuristic typology (for details cf. appendix) builds on the assumption that any analysis of participation has to ask who actually participates, how, and why, i.e. the forms of participatory procedures have to be linked to specific functions. With regard to the formal dimension, the typology considers the kind of participating social groups (who), the division of roles between participating groups or participants as well as the procedural rules (how). The functional dimension (why) focuses on the nature of the issues at stake, the intended target group of the results, the objective and tasks as well as the performance or effectiveness of the participatory procedure.
The classification rests on the formal dimension insofar as the distinguishing criterion is the number and heterogeneity of social groups involved in the participatory procedure; this leads to seven basic procedural models: (1) dialogue procedure, (2) pTA in a narrow sense, (3) legal public hearing, (4) consensus conference, (5) extended consensus conference, (6) voting conference, and (7) scenario workshop. Finally, a linkage between the formal and functional dimension allows discussing the different types of pTA from a perspective of theories of democracy.
(1) The dialogue procedure involves interest groups only; different interest groups are selected either because they are representative for the discussed issue or directly affected by it. The form dimension is characterised by two aspects: firstly, all participating interest groups are equal with regard to effective procedural rules. Secondly, the major mode of communication is arguing, yet there may be some element of bargaining involved. Interest groups shall unveil their interests and develop an understanding for each others perspectives regarding the issue at stake. In relation to the function, the procedure accompanies more concrete planning processes (e.g. authorisation of field release of genetically modified organisms, GMOs). The target group for the achieved output is policy makers, interest groups and the public in general. The objective or task is to install a dialogue between competing interest groups, to explore the diversity of goals, as well as to identify where there is consensus and open up areas where there is lack of agreement. The assumed effect is to unravel competing perspectives, to serve as a clearing-house for competing interests and a blockaderunner, as well as to filter policy-alternatives. While it is essentially a liberal-pluralist procedure given the key role of interest groups, it clearly has deliberative elements insofar as interests have to be defended on good reasons and are perceived as open to change. A typical example is the Dutch Gideon Project (Est et al. 2002) .
(2) Model 2 is a pTA type in a strict sense insofar as it is a purely argumentative expertstakeholder discourse; the best example is the TA procedure on herbicide resistant plants organised by the Berlin-based Science Centre, WZB (van den Daele et al. 1996) . Participants are chosen because they represent relevant scientific or social perspectives. While scientific experts are in a key position and stakeholders are forced into an arguing mode, the participants have quite strong control over the procedural rules via the permanent co-ordination between groups. The model is applicable to general debates about technologies and the target groups are policy makers and the general public.
The key objective is to achieve a scientific consensus about areas of uncontested knowledge by arguing between experts and counter-experts. The expectation regarding its function is to identify policy alternatives that help to increase the legitimacy of follow-up political decisions. At first sight, this model looks very expertocratic given the strong position of scientific arguments excluding modes of non-scientific communication. However, it is actually rather deliberative insofar as political disputes are transformed into a scientific discourse whose results can then be appraised in political debates; all arguments are fed back into the deliberation.
(3) The legal public hearing (Erörterungstermin) as part of an administrative authorisation process is, indeed, wide-spread in many planning processes and, essentially, not at all specific to science governance. For example, European Union regulations for the deliberate release of GMOs, require public participation and for a while member states have introduced such public hearings.
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This is the only model closely linked to public administration and decision-making, while all other models are purely advisory. In the legal public hearing, law and politics are intertwined. The participants are first of all those who feel affected by the issue at stake (often locals) as well as scientific experts. This is the most open procedure in terms of access for everybody. The administrator is in the key position and the procedural rules are severely restricted by the legal framing. Only those arguments are taken into account by the administrators in the final decision that are considered valid against legal standards; this implies a preference for scientific arguments while other kinds of objections (e.g. religious or political reasons) are procedurally excluded. Affected persons have an advisory role and add to the kind of expertise. Given the legal-administrative framing, the addressee of the hearing is the public administrator who has to take the final decision.
The objective is deliberation in a very Habermasian sense, i.e. to influence policy using good arguments. Given its strong legal basis, this model is most explicit about it five normative functions:
to inform the affected citizens; to inform the administrator; to represent stakes; to legally protect the applicants and those who feel affected; and to increase the legitimacy of the final administrative decision. This model is highly participatory, because there are no limitations as to who can participate (access); in fact, this model is very deliberative since only good arguments can prevail in the procedure. However, there are limitations as to what counts as a good argument in the context of the legal framing, namely arguments rooted in sound science. This procedural limitation turns out to be the key problem for the legitimacy function of this type of pTA, whereas there may be a high degree of accountability given that the administrator -at least in German administrative law -has to respond to all objections raised, whatever their nature and legal relevance.
(4) The best known pTA model is the Danish-style consensus conference. This model includes also procedures well-known as citizen jury, citizen's forum, PublicForum (Switzerland) and the like (or the German "Planungszelle"). It has its roots in civil society engagement and the search for the public interest; its boom in some European countries (e.g. Denmark, UK, Germany), North America, and increasingly also some Asian countries as well as Australia is built on the perception of a failure of parliamentary democracy (Joss and Durant 1995; Andersen and Jaeger 1999) . Moreover, it is very common with regard to conflicts over biotechnology and human genetics due to its ability to include moral issues. The participants are lay persons and experts. The lay persons are surely in the key position: supported by a facilitator they set the agenda, they question the experts, and they write up the final citizen report. The lay panel is usually a random selection of citizens (in addition to some deliberate criteria such as sex, age, geography etc. only limited access to the hearing with experts, but not to the internal debate of the lay panel.
(6) The extended consensus conference also includes co-opted interest groups in a specific way.
Again, lay persons are in the key position and are in control of the procedure; the interests groups deliver a statement, which is then evaluated by the lay persons with the help of experts. The output is the same as for model 4 and so are the main functions. An additional aspect is the exploration of objectives by including interest groups statements. The procedure is deliberative, but also has some pluralist elements due to the involvement of interest groups. They shall become more responsive to public interests represented by the lay people by being forced to defend their own stakes in an argumentative mode rather than using bargaining strategies. Typical examples are the Swiss Gene Dialog and the UK Citizen Foresight Project GM Food .
The following models 6 and 7 both involve interest groups in the deliberative process, too, and both are targeted to policy-makers and the general public.
(6) In a voting conference a total of up to 180 lay persons, experts and policy-makers are chosen on a representative criterion. Their task is to evaluate scenarios or action plans developed by interest groups, who are themselves not directly involved in the deliberation. Regarding the other three groups, they enjoy equal procedural rights. The highlight of the procedure is the hearing with the interest groups where these groups, again, have to argue for their specific scenarios on 'good reasons', i.e. they are forced in a deliberate mode of communication. The general public is invited to attend the hearing (with no voting rights) which adds some participatory element to the procedure.
The main task is to evaluate perspectives from different interest groups and to vote -in a secret ballot and in the separate groups -on the proposed action plans. By combining voting and deliberation, the procedure can help to eliminate the knowledge gaps often encountered in pure voting systems (e.g. public referenda). Especially due to the voting aspect the procedure can serve as a filter for competing policy options. However, it is more conflicting than pure deliberate procedure and leaves no space for consensus-building. Voting on competing options inevitably creates winners and losers, the last ones then may question the procedural legitimacy. Public interest groups may profit from this model more than special interest groups; the last ones may fear that losing has negative repercussions on their traditional channels of pressure group politics and for that reason refrain from participating in a voting conference or in pTA in general (Hendriks 2002) . A good example is the Danish Voting Conference Drinking Water (Klüver 2002) . (7) The last model is the scenario workshop; it shares some similarities with model 5 and 6. This model was also developed by the Danish Board of Technology and then adopted by the European Commission for the "sustainable cities campaign"; good examples are the "Szenario Workshop on
Urban Ecology" and the "Future Search Conference on Traffic in Big Cities" (Klüver 2002) . The formal characteristic is that a total of 60-90 lay people, policy-makers, experts and interest groups deliberate in separate groups -in order to identify group-specific perspectives -as well as with each other -in order to identify commonalities. All participating groups enjoy equal procedural rights. All participants are selected according to representative criteria; local issue dominate. The procedural rule is that the participating groups evaluate pre-given scenarios or they can collectively develop scenarios. The main objective of the model is to influence the planning process and to initiate a dialogue between the various actor groups that should help to increase understanding for the different perspectives. The model does have an agenda-setting function and can help to overcome procedural deadlock; the expected performance is to increase political legitimacy for the results. This is a participatory-deliberative model given that the local public and especially concerned groups have an opportunity to participate regarding local issues. The model also contains some pluralist elements given the strong involvement of interest groups and that consensus-building on the final action plan allows for some bargaining. The participation of policy-makers enhances the chances that the results feed into the actual policy-making process. At the same time, the participation of those directly concerned brings along new tensions and conflicts.
Does participation improve the legitimacy and accountability of science governance?
The typology of the seven models illustrates some interesting similarities as well as differences between them that pertain to the normative criteria of legitimacy and accountability ( The typology clearly illustrates that all models of pTA heavily draw on deliberative democracy (S6). However, some models aim to integrate additional elements stemming from alternative models of democracy such as pluralism (model 1 and 5), or participatory democracy (model 3 and 7). The mode of communication in all models is arguing (S4); even the stakeholder discourse draws on arguing in order to foster communicative interaction among interest groups. The models that integrate interest groups in one way or another (model 1, 2, 5, 6 and 7) -be it as the only participants involved (model 1), be it as one group of participants among others (model 5 and 7) or be it as a groups whose arguments are evaluated by other participating groups (model 2:
experts, model 6: lay people, experts, policy-makers) -all assume that it is possible to employ the 'soft power of the best argument' and that interests undergo a purgatory process when they have to be defended in a discourse against the criterion of (a) scientific reasoning always involved in science governance and (b) the common good to be represented, above all, by the lay people. In so doing, the factual dimension of cognitive uncertainty in science governance in general as well as pTA in particular and the social dimension of competing interests is to be reconciled or integrated. In theory, participation of a plurality of social actors in science governance can thus improve the input as well as the output legitimacy.
Although there are today a number of empirical studies on pTA, there is no conclusive evidence that the different ascribed, yet mainly vague, function are actually fulfilled (D4). There are manifold reasons for this severe desideratum. Firstly, pTA research faces methodological problems.
An assessment of the input legitimacy, for example, would require not only to look at participating groups, but also at potentially excluded groups, because we cannot simply assume that all relevant positions are de facto included in the discourse -this is, after all, an ideal condition. In participatory procedures, where groups can self-identify themselves as being concerned and hence have a relevant voice, this may be a minor problem. Furthermore, interviewing participants if they are satisfied with the procedure is surely necessary for improving the participatory methods, 7 but not sufficient for assessing wider input legitimacy. Interestingly, the wider public is sometimes integrated, yet often excluded from the procedure (D2). If the legitimising effect should pertain maybe even the public at large, this requires methodological consequences, e.g. analysis of media reports.
If we assume that high quality output is more likely to contribute to problem-solving, then the quality of the output (e.g. a common statement, a citizen report, an action plan) has to be assessed. If -due to the model applied -the output is intended to be grounded mainly in scientific knowledge (e.g. model 2), then scientific peer review is, for example, a possible option for assessing the quality. Yet many pTA models are dominated by lay people and their communication (S3) . Yet, what quality standards can be applied to forms of output that entail a plurality of expertise, including non-scientific expertise (e.g. citizen report)? Here the general problem of quality control of mode 2 knowledge production comes into play. This is not to say that better quality -assessed by whatever criteria -has automatically a better chance to be effective in problem-solving. The impact of pTA depends as much on the social as on the political context and timing is a crucial factor. When the output of participatory procedures is 'fed into' the policy process, a set of additional criteria play out such as feasibility, financial constraints etc. -in fact, this holds true for of any kind of expertise. The literature illustrates that especially procedures dominated by lay-people tend to produce very unspecific and broad results that are hard to integrate into policy-making. , Yet, 'balanced' models are empirically still new and less widely used (D3), but they may be more effective with regard to social learning among participants as well as with regard to a potential impact of results. From a methodological perspective this requires to open up the black box of the pTA procedure itself.
While questions of procedural rules and procedural justice have been a key concern of pTA research, the deliberation process itself has not been scrutinized. Such data are, indeed, hardly available at all (e.g. recordings of the arguing interaction). Such communication studies would allow analysing the link between input and output in participatory procedures; some individual actors or social groups may have a greater impact on the deliberation (especially when we take the strong communicative bias into account) and, therefore, also on the final output such as the report. The claim that input is related to output, in this sense, still waits for empirical verification. This has obvious consequences for the question of legitimacy.
This relates to a second principal problem: Participatory procedures are never a substitute for political decision-making, their role is merely advisory (S5). Even though deliberative procedures have a systematic role to play in policy-preparation, there is still the crucial issue if and how they are actually linked to political institutions and to political decision-making. All pTA models directed are towards the legislative and/or executive branch of governments; however, the literature clearly illustrates that their actual links to political institutions is, by and large, very weak (S1). Frequently pTA is completely detached from the institutionalised political agenda and decision-making; only few participatory procedures actually have some empirical impact on political decision-making (Bütschi and Nentwich 2002; Joss 1998) . This requires thinking about institutional design, i.e. how deliberative procedures can be built into representative democracy. This is still one of the key problems of deliberative democracy in general, which also pertains to pTA, especially since it is often conducted by social actors (e.g. organisations for TA, science museums and the like). The more balanced pTA models, which integrate policy-makers in the actual process of knowledge production, may have a much better chance to produce outputs that can be utilized in policy-making.
Also, linking pTA to other models of TA and policy advice (e.g. ethics committees) could be an option to be further explored.
While there is empirically a lack of prove that pTA has an impact on policy-making, there is still the enlightening function for the general public (S2). In some of the literature we do find a re-orientation of pTA towards the public sphere. This line of argument, firstly, bypasses the question of institutional design; it turns attention to an even vaguer possible function of pTA that, again, still does not answer the legitimacy question. This is even harder to achieve when the role of the general public is not always clear or when it is marginalized as an audience (D2). Yet, from a broad perspective on accountability, which includes social mobilisation and public sphere discourse, this enlightening and educating function is a relevant aspect (see PubAcc project relationship exists and that it works in the theoretically assumed way. Again, models in which a number of heterogeneous social groups interact in the pTA process (D1; e.g. model 5, 6 and 7) may work better in this respect, because they allow for the direct interaction between lay citizens, interest groups and policy-makers. Of these groups at least policy-makers on accountability relationships in so far as they have to integrate public concerns and the common good; to some extent, this is also true for interest groups, at least those which claim to represent public interests (e.g. environmental or consumer groups).
In sum, the question if pTA can help to increase legitimacy and accountability in the contested field of science governance is still open -conceptually as well as empirically. Future systematic and comparative research has to scrutinize, for example, which models are more likely to fulfil the key functions of pTA and under which conditions. With regard to linking pTA to political institutions and representative democracy there is a need for procedural differentiation. This means that while some models work in one context, they may not work in a different social and political setting. Participation is not participation is not participation; it can be realised in very different forms for very different functions. The legal public hearing (model 3) is a good example (cf. above). Given that all non-scientific concerns are excluded as invalid, it is likely that this results in a delegitimization of the final administrative decision and ongoing social contestation. A possible conclusion is that public participation creates systematic problems in administrative decisionmaking; however, it could make sense in administrative rule-making and, moreover, in legislative norm development.
Conclusions
The practical expansion of pTA and the development of its conceptual foundation is an exciting political and theoretical challenge that has be taken up in the last ten to fifteen years. The participatory revolution starting in the 1960s has now 'infiltrated' the field of science and technology governance. The debate over science governance is so far dominated by rhetoric of 'democratising democracy'. Legitimacy and -yet to a lesser extent -accountability are key normative functions of public involvement in policy-making. Yet, as the discussion of the typology illustrates, not all models aim at the same dimension of legitimacy or at accountability in the same way. Participatory So far, pTA was mainly limited to the national level. Only recently first experiments with citizen involvement at the supranational EU level were started -the 'Meeting of Minds' on brain research, a consensus conference type of multi-level pTA. On the one hand, this is only logical given that today the development of science and technology is often organized in highly international networks and the EU is a dedicated promoter of such networking in Europe. Furthermore, the EU still suffers from the food scandals and the GMO crisis, which has turned public attention to the supranational system of risk regulation and science governance (Abels 2002) . On the other hand, this has severe repercussions for the issue of multi-level legitimacy and accountability, which I can only touch upon. Transnational democracy is still a hot issue in political science (see Wolf 2000) .
The liberal political theorist Robert Dahl (1994) brought to the fore that against the background of Europeanization and globalisation citizen participation and system effectiveness are hard to reconcile, because those affected by decisions can no longer effectively control (not to speak of real participation) in policy-making; he even speaks of a "democratic dilemma". Dahl himself argues for strengthening the national and subnational level. This dilemma also affects pTA. One of its key claims is to improve both -and in so doing reconcile -input and output legitimacy via deliberation.
Yet, pTA is mainly limited to the national political and public sphere -and even the directions for strengthening participation even at this level are unclear. The linkage to the political system is vague.
Its application at supranational or international level, where most technology development takes place, is even more problematic.
A major line of arguing in this paper is that even after some years of research on pTA, our Source: (Abels and Bora 2004) 
